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Essay

Law, Responsibility, and the Brain
Dean Mobbs*, Hakwan C. Lau, Owen D. Jones, Christopher D. Frith

A

rchaeological discoveries
of traumatic injuries in
primitive hominid skulls
strongly hint that our species has a
long history of violence [1]. Despite
repeated attempts throughout
history, including efforts to eliminate
violence through the imposition
of criminal sanctions, we have
yet to dispel our violent nature.
Consequently, criminal violence
remains a common feature of most
societies. As policy-makers seek
deeper understandings of criminally
violent and anti-social behaviour,
many contemporary neuroscientists
assume that the essential ingredients
of the human condition, including
free will, empathy, and morality, are
the calculable consequences of an
immense assembly of neurons ﬁring.
Intuitively, this view opposes Cartesian
dualism (i.e., the brain and mind are
separate, but interacting, entities)
and assumes that violence and antisocial behaviour emanate from a
mechanistically determined brain (see
Box 1).
From this standpoint, the exciting
discoveries of neuroscience resonate
far beyond mere philosophical
banter and may have important
implications for the way government
institutions, including education and
legal systems, operate. For example,
to the extent that legal systems
attempt both to move behaviour
in socially desirable directions and
also to adjudicate transgressions
fairly, the legal system’s effectiveness
can be improved by deepening
our understandings about why
people behave as they do and both
how and why people respond to
various changes in legal incentives.
Speciﬁcally, neuroscience may have
important implications for both how
we understand the multiple inﬂuences
on violent behaviour and how the
legal system may better engage with
violent criminals.
Essays articulate a speciﬁc perspective on a topic of
broad interest to scientists.
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Table 1. Examples of Prefrontal Brain Regions Associated with Pro-Social Behaviour
Brain Region

Pro-Social Behaviour

Anterior cingulate cortex
Orbital PFC
Ventromedial PFC
Ventrolateral PFC
Dorsolateral PFC

Empathy [71,72]
Regret [24]
Ethical decisions [73,74]
Inhibition of behaviour [75]
Reasoning [46,76]

doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050103.t001

Studies of the Prefrontal Cortex
in Anti-Social and Violent
Populations
The birth of what may be coined
modern “forensic neurology” lies
in John Harlow’s 19th century
observations of Phineas P. Gage [2].
Gage, a railroad worker, suffered the
unfortunate experience of having an
iron bar blasted through the front of
his brain, which resulted in extensive
damage to the prefrontal cortex (PFC).
Despite Gage’s miraculous physical
and intellectual recovery, conspicuous
changes in his personality were
reported. Brieﬂy, the once courteous
and diligent man became explicitly
anti-social. As Gage’s friends famously
articulated, “Gage is no longer Gage”.
Since Harlow’s lurid description,
computerized reconstructions based on
Gage’s skull fractures have determined
more precisely the damaged PFC
regions, which current evidence
associates with autonomic, social,
and affect regulation [3]. The case of
Phineas Gage is compelling to both
neuroscientists and legal thinkers
because it provided the ﬁrst indication
that reasoning and regard for others
can be compromised by frontal lobe
injury. Harlow’s observations have
led many experts to speculate that
neurological insult may be a prominent
factor in recidivistic and violent
criminal transgressions.
Modern empirical endeavours
support the claim that the human PFC,
a latecomer in the brain’s phylogenic
history, is what makes us rational,
intellectual, and moral entities (Table
1). For example, several studies on
patients with focal frontal lobe injuries
have supported Harlow’s case [4,5]. In
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one of the largest studies of patients
with brain damage to date, Grafman
and colleagues found that increased
aggressive/violent scale scores were
most strongly associated with similarly
localized PFC lesions in a sample of
279 veterans of the Vietnam War [6].
Higher scores were, however, mostly
associated with verbal aggression and
less so with physical aggression, again
ﬁtting with Harlow’s observations of
Gage [2]. These studies, along with
clinical observations, have led many
to suggest that damage to the PFC
results in “acquired sociopathy” or
“pseudopsychopathy”.
Given the PFC’s historical and
theoretical relevance to adaptive social
behaviour, it is not surprising that
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Figure 1. Regions Associated with Normal and Atypical Social Behaviour
(A) Medial and lateral view of the PFC.
(B) View of the ventral surface of the PFC and temporal poles.
(C) Coronal slice illustrating the amygdalar and insular cortex.
See also Table 1.
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral PFC; MFd, medial PFC; oMFC, orbitomedial PFC; TP, temporal pole; vlPFC, ventrolateral PFC; vmPFC,
ventromedial PFC.

this region was among the ﬁrst to be
examined in anti-social and violent
populations. Raine and colleagues used
noninvasive structural brain imaging
to show an 11% reduction in PFC
grey matter in patients with anti-social
personality disorder (APD) [7]. These
decreases in grey matter were also
associated with decreased autonomic
arousal to a social stressor (i.e., videotaped speech about an individual’s
faults). Similar reductions have been
observed in a study of aggressive
patients [8] and of pathological liars
[9]. Nonetheless, such morphological
and volumetric abnormalities may not
necessarily relate to behaviour.
In principal, using brain imaging to
look at function rather than structure
should reveal stronger relationships
between brain and behaviour. Using
positron emission tomography
scanning, neuroscientists have found
attenuated resting regional cerebral
blood ﬂow in the frontal lobes of
violent individuals [10] and convicted
criminals [11]. In healthy volunteers,
evoked anger and imagined aggressive
transgressions are associated with
reduced modulation of the orbital and
medial PFC [12]. Collectively, these
studies suggest that impulsive violent
acts stem from diminished recruitment
of the PFC’s “inhibition” systems.

PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org

Beyond the PFC
The PFC is not, however, the only area
where damage may increase propensity
toward behaviours deemed criminal
or anti-social. It has long been known
that ablation of the monkey temporal
lobe, including the amygdala, results
in blunted emotional responses [13]
(Figure 1C). In humans, brain-imaging
and lesion studies have suggested a
role of the amygdala in theory of mind,
aggression [14], and the ability to
register fear and sadness in faces [15].
According to the violence inhibition
model, both sad and fearful facial
cues act as important inhibitors if we
are violent towards others. In support
of this model, recent investigations
have shown that individuals with
a history of aggressive behaviour
have poorer recognition of facial
expressions [16], which might be due
to amygdala dysfunction [17]. Others
have recently demonstrated how the
low expression of X-linked monoamine
oxidase A (MAOA)—which is an
important enzyme in the catabolism of
monoamines, most notably serotonin
(5-HT), and has been associated
with an increased propensity towards
reactive violence in abused children
[18]—is associated with volume
changes and hyperactivity in the
amygdala [19].
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The amygdala has been a major
focus of attempts to understand the
poor empathy and fear responses
observed in psychopathic criminals.
Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), Birbaumer and
coworkers [20] presented individuals
with a paradigm in which the
appearance of a face on a screen
was followed by a painful shock in
one condition but not in a second
condition. Analysis showed normal
volunteers to have increased activity
in the amygdala (see Figure 1) in
response to faces associated with shock,
whereas psychopathic individuals
showed no signiﬁcant change in
activity in this region. In addition,
psychopaths also failed to show
normal increases in skin conductance
responses. Importantly, Birbaumer et
al.’s ﬁndings are supported by studies
showing that the limbic structures
(i.e., amygdala and hippocampus) are
functionally abnormal in psychopathic
criminals during emotional memory
[21] and by studies showing how
activity in the amygdala decreases with
increased scores on the Psychopathy
Personality Inventory [12,22]. A
prevailing hypothesis is that in
psychopathic criminals the prefrontal–
amygdala connections are disrupted,
leading to deﬁcits in contextual fear
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conditioning [23], regret [24], guilt
[25], and affect regulation [26].

Does the Crime Fit the Brain?
While many behaviours can be
unambiguously deﬁned, labelling a
behaviour as “criminal” is to deﬁne
how the behaviour will be considered
socially. That is, the very same
behaviour that might not be deemed
criminal in one social context (say,
shooting a gun at a target at a shooting
range) may be deemed criminal in
another (such as shooting a gun in the
direction of a crowd of people). Such
deﬁnitional ambiguities are at their
least frequent, however, with respect to
interpersonal violence, which is broadly
proscribed.
It is clear in at least some contexts
that different violent anti-social
behaviours can arise from different
etiologies. Animal studies have
shown that distinct networks underlie
different types of aggression (e.g.,
predatory attack and defensive rage
[27]). From these studies, one might
expect that in humans, distinct neural
topographies exist in, for example, the
sexual criminal, the sadistic murderer,
and the political terrorist. At ﬁrst
glance, such reasoning looks like
phrenological folly; however, evidence
does suggest that violent behaviour can
be placed into two broad, yet distinct,
categories: affective aggression (i.e.,
impulsive, autonomic arousing, and
emotional) and predatory aggression
(i.e., premeditated, goal-directed, and
emotionless) [28].
With this dichotomy in mind,
Raine and colleagues [29] reanalyzed
positron emission tomography data
to tease apart functional differences
between premeditated psychopaths
and impulsive affective murderers.
Compared to controls, the impulsive
murderers had reduced activation
in the bilateral PFC, while activity in
the limbic structures was enhanced.
Conversely, the predatory psychopaths
had relatively normal prefrontal
functioning, but increased right
subcortical activity, which included
the amygdala and hippocampus.
These results suggest that predatory
psychopaths are able to regulate their
impulses, in contrast to impulsive
murderers, who lack the prefrontal
“inhibitory” machinery that stop them
from committing violent transgressions.
Although more work is necessary, these

PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org

studies strongly suggest that some kinds
of criminal behaviour are associated
with dysfunction of different regions of
the brain.

Does Some Criminal Behaviour
Result from Mental Disorder?
A great deal of empirical research
demonstrates that mental illness is
higher in incarcerated populations
and estimates that as many as 25% of
defendants evaluated for competency
are medically and legally incompetent
to stand trial [30]. Moreover, only
36% of the public perceive recidivistic
crime as an organic disorder [31].
Consequently, weighing discrepancies
between intuitions, expert views, and
empirical ﬁndings is of fundamental
importance to a legal system.
Both the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders and
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases
10 classiﬁcations of mental and
behavioural disorders include APD,
which is deﬁned respectively in the two
classiﬁcations as a lack of regard for
the feelings of others and a failure to

abide by society’s rules. While it can
be said that any given population of
incarcerated criminals may not be a
representative sample of all criminals,
or even of all criminals who pass
through the prison system, a systematic
review of studies examining mental
illness in 23,000 prisoners showed
that these prisoners were several times
more likely to have some form of
psychosis or major depression, and
ten times more likely to exhibit APD
than the general population [32].
The authors suggest that, worldwide,
several million prisoners have serious
mental illness [32]. Several studies also
show levels of head injury to be higher
in violent and death-row criminals
[33], while birth complications,
which can often result in neurological
damage (e.g., hypoxic-ischemic
encephalopathy) and parental mental
illness, are higher in anti-social
populations [31]. More often than
not, people with APD and violent
behaviour have a history of childhood
maltreatment or trauma [34]; having
such a history has been linked to

Box 1. Should We Rethink Free Will?
Research linking the brain to antisocial and criminal behaviour also raises
neurophilosophical questions concerning
our liberty. Most neuroscientists hold
that “minds are simply what brains
do” [62]. Indeed, with the omission of
metaphysical constructs like the “mind”,
many take the view that we are tied to
the physical brain and, as a consequence,
have little personal choice. A series of
classic, yet controversial, studies by
Benjamin Libet and colleagues showed
that brain activity associated with
deliberate decisions can be detected
shortly before we are conscious of
making the decision [63]. In these studies,
participants reported when they ﬁrst felt
the intention to make a spontaneous
movement by noting the position of a
dot moving on computer screen. They
apparently ﬁrst became aware of their
intentions about 200 milliseconds before
action execution, which is later than the
onset of the so-called readiness potential
(or “bereitschaftspotential”) recorded
from the scalp prior to movement.
Despite criticisms about the accuracy
of this timing method, recent research
[64,65] has shown that if anything, the
actual onset of conscious intention
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is likely to be even later. Moreover,
psychologists report that our attributions
of agency to actions are often illusory
[66].
Despite these claims, free will as a
concept is still unlikely to be eliminated.
Clearly free will is a prerequisite for
moral agency, and for society to run
smoothly, we all need to believe that
we are in full control of our actions. Not
surprisingly, some have tried to ﬁnd a
middle ground in this argument. For
example, Raine has entertained the idea
that free will should be viewed along a
“dimension rather than a dichotomy”
([31], p. 320), while Gazzaniga has argued
that “brains are automatic, but people
are free” ([52], p. 98). Is it reasonable,
however, to posit that some people are
more free than others? For example, few
can dispute the fact that brain diseases
such as schizophrenia and Huntington
disease reduce the ability to act freely.
Nonetheless, most juries may never have
explicitly discussed the concept of free
will [52]. Neurophilosophy may play an
important role in understanding and
updating the intuitions concerning free
will and responsibility that may implicitly
underlie juror deliberations.
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Box 2. Brain Fingerprinting and Lie Detection
Lie detection technology is one of the
most obvious legal uses of brain imaging,
and several new companies (e.g., No Lie
MRI) are beginning to commercialise
their services to lawyers and prosecutors.
However, despite there being several
published empirical studies on lie
detection, results seem to be far from
conclusive. Early brain-imaging studies of
how the brain responds when we willfully
lie showed that speciﬁc zones of the
PFC increase in activity when individuals
lie—the same regions known to come
online when tasks become more difﬁcult
and when we need to control or inhibit
responses [67]. However, one problem
with most studies of lie detection is
that they use group averages, which
make ﬁrm conclusions about individual
cases impossible. Although more work
is needed, recent studies on single
individuals have shown promise, with lie
detection accuracy in the range of 80%–
90% [68]. Proponents argue that the use
of brain imaging to detect deception is
less prone to countermeasures, making
it more reliable than the polygraph
test [69]. Not surprisingly, government
institutions have become increasingly
interested (e.g., US Department of
Defense) and have been criticized as

being “Orwellian”. However like the
polygraph, brain imaging is unlikely to be
universally admissible in court until it is
shown to be valid, reliable, and relevant.
Another technique—
brain ﬁngerprinting—uses
electroencephalography to examine
the memory and encoding related
multifaceted electroencephalographic
response (MERMER). To measure this, an
individual is shown crime scene pictures
(i.e., the murder weapon), and changes
in brain activity (speciﬁcally the P300
component) are monitored. The brain
reacts differently to images it recognises
versus ones that it does not recognise,
so, for example, if an individual did use
a speciﬁc weapon to kill a person, the
brain will react differently to images
of the murder weapon than to images
of other weapons not used in the
crime. Brain ﬁngerprinting evidence
has been admitted in some cases, such
as in the Iowa murder trial of Terry
Harrington. However, despite its claimed
potential, brain ﬁngerprinting has been
criticised for problems with developing
adequate test stimuli, vulnerability to
countermeasures, and—because it’s
patented—a failure to be appropriately
veriﬁed by peer review [70].

anomalous development of regions
associated with anti-social behaviour,
including the PFC, hippocampus,
amygdala, corpus callosum, and
hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis
[35]. Early damage to the orbitofrontal
cortex in particular appears to result
in poor acquisition of moral and
social rules [36], thus showing the
importance of the interaction between
environment and brain development.
Discussing the possibility of
meaningful links between some antisocial and violent behaviour and
various brain disorders can, however,
enrage retributivists, who point
out that moral responsibility lies in
the social rules by which acts are
judged—not in the brain itself [37].
Nonetheless, there are many instances
where brain disease can lead to antisocial behaviour, and these inevitably
pose important complications for
moral and legal systems that tend to
divide responsibility for actions into
dichotomous alternatives—guilty
versus not guilty—instead of seeing

responsibility as existing along a
continuum. For example, compared to
the general population, individuals with
frontotemporal dementia, Huntington
disease, and attention deﬁcit/
hyperactive disorder have a higher
prevalence of episodic aggression or
anti-social conduct. One disturbing
example cited by Goldberg [38] is the
case of a New York surgeon who, after
ﬁnishing surgery, carved his signature
in the patient’s stomach. The surgeon
was later diagnosed with Pick disease
(a form of dementia associated with
personality changes that presumably
result from progressive degeneration of
frontal and anterior temporal cortices).
He was not considered responsible for
his actions by experts, the jury, or even
the victim. Beyond these examples
lies the possibility that some forms of
anti-social or violent behaviour are of
unspeciﬁed origin, which could place
them in the same category as many
other neuropsychiatric disorders.
Presumably, such unrecognized brain
abnormalities might cause acts of

PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org
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gratuitous violence, but the individuals
concerned would be considered to be
criminally responsible.
To be clear, there is at present no
reason to believe that all criminal
behaviours, or indeed even all violent
criminal behaviours, are the result
of organically dysfunctional brains.
However, there is ample evidence to
suggest that some kinds of dysfunction
are likely to increase the probability
of some kinds of behaviours that
society labels as criminal. This suggests
that research is urgently needed to
elucidate the links between mental
illness, neurological disorder, and
criminal conduct. And modern and
rapidly improving brain-imaging
techniques may contribute signiﬁcantly.

Possible Legal Implications
Advances in neuroscience could
have several implications for the
legal system. At the broadest level,
these include (i) understanding
how cognitive processes of key legal
participants (such as judges and
jurors) inﬂuence trial outcomes,
(ii) discovering whether various
assumptions underlying the evidentiary
rules (such as one suggesting that
“excited utterances” are less likely
than average to be falsehoods) have
any basis in fact, (iii) learning more
about how people determine “just”
punishments, (iv) anticipating how
jurors may over-react to certain kinds
of character evidence, (v) determining
the extent of injuries from accidents,
(vi) improving our abilities to detect
mental biases and prejudices that may
affect the proper function of legal
fact-ﬁnding and decision-making, and
(vii) learning more about the limits of
witness memories. Yet even against this
broad background, few implications
for the legal system are more
important than trying to gain a better
understanding of important inﬂuences
on criminal behaviour.
However, that very signiﬁcance
brings its own important challenges.
On one hand, a better understanding
may lead to more effective deterrence,
to more effective treatment, and
to more just and morally sound
sentencing. On the other hand,
determining criminal responsibility
is a normative legal conclusion, not
an empirical factual one, made in the
context of a variety of often conﬂicting
aspirations [39]. Therefore, even the
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best neuroscientiﬁc study can only
afford factual evidence to be weighed
alongside other behavioural evidence
and normative considerations, rather
than actually resolve the legal question
as to which the factual evidence is
relevant.
Generally speaking, in the AngloAmerican criminal justice system,
a person can be held criminally
responsible if he performs a prohibited
act intentionally and with a statutorily
speciﬁed mental state (which may span
such things as “purpose”, “knowledge”,
“recklessness”, or “negligence”) [39].
Yet even if these criteria are satisﬁed,
the defendant can be excused from
liability if legally insane. That is, he
may have intentionally and knowingly
committed a proscribed act, but be
found not blameworthy nonetheless,
because a mental condition meeting
a speciﬁed legal (as distinct from
medical) threshold prevented him
either from knowing the nature
and quality of his act, or from
understanding the wrongfulness of the
act [40].
The possibility of being “not guilty
by reason of insanity” can be traced
back to the well-known M’Naghten
case in 1843. While attempting
to kill the British Prime Minister,
Daniel M’Naghten mistakenly killed
the Prime Minister’s secretary.
Experts maintained that M’Naghten
exhibited such a vast deterioration
in his reasoning abilities (believing
the Prime Minister to be heading a
murderous conspiracy) that he had
no comprehension of the act he
committed. The modern standards
for determining legal insanity, in
the long wake of M’Naghten, vary
markedly across jurisdictions, with
results that have prompted many calls
for reform. For example, psychiatrists
have been plagued by the need to
answer dichotomously whether a
defendant is “mad” or “bad” or to
opine that “it is not him, it is his
disease” [41]. Furthermore, medical
research indicates that patients with
selective damage to the PFC can often
know right from wrong, but still be
unable to act on such knowledge. This
has naturally led defence attorneys
and prosecutors to pursue more
objective ways of determining whether
a defendant is competent to stand
trial, and if so, whether he can be held
legally responsible for his actions.

PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org

doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050103.g002

Figure 2. Cases Where Brain Anomalies Have, or Have Not, Been Linked to Anti-Social
Behaviour
(A) Brain scan of patient J. S., who exhibited sociopathic behaviour [5]. The image shows a lesion in
the orbital frontal cortex.
(B) fMRI sagittal slice of the brain of patient J. Z., showing a lesion that was caused by the resection
of pituitary tumour [4]. This lesion led to anti-social conduct, which was not exhibited before the
surgery.
(C) Orbitofrontal damage associated with symptoms of paedophilia and sexual misconduct in the
case of a 40-year-old male patient.
(D) Photograph of a patient after head injury (right) and fMRI scan 60 years later showing PFC
damage (left) [53]. This patient showed personality changes, but no signs of anti-social conduct.
(E) Cranial X-ray of a man who attempted suicide with a crossbow. Although the individual
exhibited premorbid APD, the PFC damage caused by the crossbow arrow resulted in reversal of
anti-social conduct [54].

This, in turn, has generated signiﬁcant
interest in brain-imaging evidence
concerning a defendant’s mental
functioning (Box 2).
Several examples illustrate the kinds
of contexts in which many believe that
brain imaging may aid the law’s ability
to accurately assess a defendant’s mental
functioning. Consider the case of a 40year-old man who inexplicably became a
sexual impulsive with paedophilia. The
patient had no prior history of sexual
misconduct, but it was soon noted that
he was frequenting prostitutes and
that he attempted to molest his 12year-old step-daughter. He was quickly
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reported to the local authorities, was
found guilty of child molestation, and
was sentenced to either attend a 12-step
sexual addiction program or face jail.
Despite a strong yearning not to go to
prison, the patient could not inhibit his
sexual impulses. It was soon discovered
that the defendant had a large tumour
pressing on his right orbitofrontal
cortex (Figure 2). Upon the resection
of the tumour, the patient’s sexual
impulsiveness diminished. When the
sexual impulsiveness later reappeared,
a brain scan revealed that the tumour
had grown back. A second resection of
tumour again diminished the patient’s
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sexual impulsiveness [42]. Another
illustration is the 1998 case of 15-yearold Kip Kinkel, who shot and killed his
parents and two high-school colleagues
in the state of Oregon. Brain imaging
was used as evidence in court to
support Kinkel’s “not guilty by reason
of insanity” plea. The trial defence
provided evidence of small cavities in
Kinkel’s frontal lobe. Although there
was no evidence that this abnormality
caused his behaviour (Kinkel was
ultimately convicted as an adult and
sentenced to 111 years in prison [43]),
future developments in neuroscience
may again aid courts in these kinds of
inquiries.
These examples raise important
questions not only about the extent
to which neuroimaging may affect
particular trial outcomes, but also
about the ways in which the legal system
can come to understand changing views
of the brain, assess when those views
are relevant, and determine how, in
appropriate circumstances, to integrate
that knowledge into legal decisionmaking [44] (see Boxes 2 and 3). For
example, recent evidence suggests
that the PFC continues to mature
until the age of 25 [45] and that this
maturation correlates with ability in
counterfactual (if–then) thinking [46].
An underdeveloped ventrolateral PFC
can be directly associated with poorer
cognitive control [47], which some
consider a core variable in criminal
activity [48]. Such research and theory
likely warrants serious consideration,
given the robust relationship between
age and violent criminal offences. For
example, British Crime Survey statistics
show that individuals between the ages
of 16 and 24 commit more violent acts
than all other age groups combined.
Such statistics have a special
relevance in countries such as the
United States where the death penalty
is applied. For example, many lawyers
who oppose capital punishment of
juveniles hold the view that the legal
system should take such neuroscientiﬁc
evidence into account (e.g., the Justice
for Children Project; http://moritzlaw.
osu.edu/jfc) [49]. It is possible that
the 2005 decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States (Roper v.
Simmons) that made it illegal to use
capital punishment for any offender
who was under the age of 18 when he
committed his crime was inﬂuenced in
part by evidence presented in amicus
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(so-called “friends of the court”)
briefs, which included neuroscientiﬁc
evidence [50].

The Limits of Brain Imaging
as Evidence
There are many exciting possibilities
for how law and neuroscience
may eventually partner—with
neuroscientists discovering new things
about the brain potentially relevant
to law, and law asking questions that
new neuroscientiﬁc research may help
address. However, it is important to
keep in mind a variety of limitations
of brain-imaging technology. We
highlight six.
First, functional brain imaging is not
mind reading. Not only can it not tell

Box 3. Plausible Uses of Brain
Imaging and Questions for
Future Research
Questions for which brain imaging might
provide useful answers:
• Does the defendant exhibit any
neurological damage?
• Do the brain abnormalities ﬁt with the
nature of the crime?
• Is the defendant faking an illness?
• Is the defendant lying about the crime?
• What is the likelihood of future
transgressions?
To begin to answer such questions,
society needs the following:
• More neurobiological research on
anti-social and criminal populations
(e.g., post-mortem histology,
diffusion tensor imaging, and brain
morphometry).
• A better classiﬁcation of the neural
activity associated with different types
of criminal activity.
• A set of criteria and parameters for
using imaging on single individuals
with and without neurological
abnormalities.
• Better understanding of the effects
of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on
the brain (e.g., interplay between
environment, development, and
genetics).
• Agreed criteria concerning validity and
reliability of brain images.
• Agreed procedures for presenting
imaging evidence in the courtroom.
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us what or how a person was thinking at
the time of a legally relevant act, it also
cannot tell us with reliable accuracy
what a person is thinking while being
scanned. In this respect, brain imaging
can only provide post hoc explanations
[31]. The challenge of functional
brain imaging has been likened to
looking from an airplane window at
night: when we look down from the
plane we see complex patterns of
lights, which we can demarcate into
towns and cities and we can gaze at
their connections through linking
road lights. However, from the plane
we achieve little understanding of the
different, social, cultural, and political
differences that exist in these blobs of
light [51]. With respect to fMRI, this
analogy is supported on a technical
level, as the details of the relationships
between metabolic demand and
increased neuronal activity are poorly
understood.
Second, as important as brain
functioning is, brain imaging provides
only one window of many into the
multiple inﬂuences on behaviour that
can be relevant to understanding why a
person acted in an anti-social manner.
Such inﬂuences include the intricate
interaction between genetic, prenatal,
endocrinological, social, cultural, and
economic factors; “No pixel in a brain
will ever be able to show culpability or
nonculpability” ([52], p. 100).
Third, despite showing remarkable
consistency with lesion, animal model,
and electrophysiological data, brain
imaging is not yet in Kuhnian terms a
“pure science”. Interpretation of brain
scans is admittedly somewhat subjective.
Anatomical landmarks in the form of
gyri and sulci differ very much from
individual to individual, and even in
adulthood the brain is not ﬁxed, but
shows plasticity and change in response
to injury that also varies from individual
to individual. Moreover, in the case of
fMRI, differences in haemodynamic
response may not necessarily relate to
neuropathology, but to vascular and
endocrinological pathology. Thus,
even if brain abnormalities are found,
individual differences in the extent and
location of the injury, and in recovery
and plasticity, present major problems
for the interpretation of brain images
in the legal setting.
While these problems can be
reduced in research through averaging
across many individuals, these are
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critical issues when examining a single
individual. For example, all the brainimaging studies conducted on violent
and anti-social populations have
studied group effects. Moreover, most
studies have examined adult males,
and the results cannot be generalised
to females and children. Accordingly,
if brain imaging is to be applied to
the forensic evaluation of the single
patient, a standardized set of tests,
procedures, and imaging parameters
are needed to achieve more valid
conclusions (see Box 3).
Fourth, correlations between brain
function and criminal behaviour are
imperfect, calling into question both
the diagnostic and predictive validity
of brain-imaging evidence. That is,
brain defects are not observed in all
violent criminals, and conversely, not
all people with PFC damage exhibit
anti-social behaviour. For example,
one longitudinal case study showed
PFC damage to result in personality
changes, but without signs of anti-social
behaviour [53]. Some studies have
shown how prefrontal damage can
even decrease anti-social behaviour
[54]. Differences in the PFC may also
be caused by other variables, including
levels of education and alcoholism
[55]. A similar pattern emerges for
the amygdala, where damage can
result in increased or decreased
aggression [23,56]. Moreover, in
court proceedings, many experts have
argued against the use of ambitious
speculations concerning the brain
(e.g., State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis
Reid Jr., 2002, No. 38887), particularly
where the link between the criminal act
and the neurological damage is based
solely on brain-imaging data.
Fifth, just as it would be
inappropriate to expect full localization
of criminality genetically [57], it
would be inappropriate to expect full
localization of criminality neurologically
[37]. Indeed, sociologists have long
provided explanations for crime and
deviance without the slightest reference
to the brain.
Sixth, brain images are not only
powerful, they can potentially be too
powerful—an effect we have referred to
as the “Christmas tree phenomenon”.
For example, in much the same way
that a prosecutor may sway jurors
with sympathetic pictures of the
innocent victim, the defence may
show brightly coloured images of the
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org

perpetrator’s allegedly dysfunctional
brain. The vividness and technological
sophistication of the images may be
over-weighted by the jurors, which
can warp justice just as surely as can
under-weighting of relevant evidence.
Brain imaging can be admissible
in courts of different jurisdictions
(e.g., under the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the United States).
However, given the increasing public
interest in brain imaging [58] and
the misinterpretations of what brain
imaging is and can do [59], it is crucial
for proper legal decision-making that
judges and jurors understand the
limitations of brain imaging.

Concluding Remarks
The goals of science and of law
are different. However, important
legal questions such as moral
blameworthiness, culpability,
responsibility, and the likelihood of
recidivism depend to some degree on
improved understandings of human
behaviour. Therefore, biological
advances in understanding human
brain architecture and function may
overlap in important ways with legal
inquiries. New studies of the criminal
brain are likely to shape moral views
on responsibility and free will, with
possible impacts on how legal systems
punish and treat criminals [60].
A growing body of research gives
us good reason to believe that some
kinds of brain dysfunction can affect
the probability of different kinds of
criminal behaviours. However, despite
our growing knowledge of the brain
abnormalities associated with anti-social
and psychopathic behaviour, there are
as yet no concrete biological markers—
genetic or physiological—that can
predict such behaviours. Violent and
anti-social behaviours undoubtedly arise
from a symphony of factors. Optimal
understanding will require cooperation
among many disciplines such as
economics, sociology, psychology,
evolutionary biology, cellular physiology,
and neuroscience [61]. 
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